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Innovative waste recycling methods have been developed in many countries by 
waste pickers (WP), which reduce overall recycling costs and expand recovered re-
sources, providing income to a jobless population. The Brazilian experience in Ex-
tended Producer Responsibility for Packaging, implemented considering the WP as 
the main participant in the scheme, was investigated using the European P-EPR, the 
most consolidated experience in the world, as the benchmark. Quantitative and qual-
itative methods, including systematic literature review, were combined to discuss 
how the models could learn from each other to compose an inclusive P-EPR scheme, 
seeking to identify accessible solutions for the implementation of Integrated Sus-
tainable WM in LMIC, taking into account their financial and governance constraints. 
Results showed that both systems are driving the recycling sector and increasing 
the efficiency of the WM, although neither has contributed to reducing the genera-
tion of waste. The BR scheme provided the recycling of different materials, but only 
the most valuable materials were recycled in the market-driven EU P-EPR. Mutual 
learning and networking between packaging producers and WP cooperatives in the 
BR P-EPR scheme improved the sustainability of the latter and knowledge of the re-
cycling market for the former, in addition to improving the traceability of the informal 
sector’s contribution to the recycling. An inclusive P-EPR scheme is suggested as 
a proposal for a more effective recovery of resources in many emerging countries, 
which can be crucial to achieve increasing plastic recycling targets agreed by many 
producers and to accomplish the ambitious EU’s objectives of waste recovery.
1. INTRODUCTION
Waste is an important element of pollution of soil, 
groundwater and marine waters to which approximately 
5% of global greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions are attribut-
ed. As a result of a linear economic model based on infinite 
growth, around 2 billion tons of solid waste are generat-
ed annually in the world and this generation is expected 
to increase by 70% until 2050 (Silpa et al. 2018). Waste 
recycling, as a part of Integrated Sustainable Waste Man-
agement (ISWM) (Wilson, Vellis and Rodic 2013), can re-
duce the scarcity of natural resources caused by the linear 
economy (Ellen Macarthur Foundation 2013) and the con-
sequent negative environmental impacts of the growing 
global trash production. Expanding the extent and depth of 
waste recycling is a key to building a more circular econo-
my (CE), contributing to the global climate change effort, 
at local and national scales (Ellen Macarthur Foundation 
2013a). Moreover, implementing solid waste management 
in cities around the world is considered essential for meet-
ing some of the United Nations' Sustainable Development 
Goals (Lenkiewicz 2016).
 The realization of ISWM around the world, however, re-
quires the identification of accessible solutions, especially 
in low and middle income countries (LMIC), where this pol-
icy is hardly implemented due to financial and governance 
restrictions (Hoornweg and Bhada- Tata 2012; Scheinberg, 
Wilson and Rodic 2010). In LMIC packaging represents 
about 20 to 30% of urban waste; in wealthy countries pack-
aging accounts half of the urban waste generated (OECD 
2001; OECD 2016). Therefore, reducing the amount of 
packaging waste that ends up in a landfill is a common tar-
get in many countries to increase the recovery of natural 
resources and save energy (Lifset, Atasu, Tojo 2013; Gupt 
and Sahay 2015). Reducing waste packaging has been 
identified also as a pivotal way of controlling marine plastic 
litter (Ellen Macarthur Foundation 2013a). Measures of Ex-
tended Responsibility to the Packaging Producer (P-EPR) 
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have been introduced in many countries to achieve these 
goals since the 1990s (GiZ 2018; OECD 2016). About 100 
P-EPR initiatives are in course in the world, most of them 
in richer countries but also in LMIC as Brazil, India, China 
and some African countries (IRR 2018, Demajorovic et al. 
2014).
 In many LMIC, packaging recycling is being carried out 
by waste pickers (WP) who have developed a low-cost and 
labour-intensive approach to waste collection and recycling 
services, which results in more waste recovery, reduces 
operational costs of waste management (WM) and turns 
waste into a means of poverty alleviation for a few million 
people (Wilson, Velis, Cheeseman 2006; Medina, 2007; Gut-
berlet, 2008; Scheinberg, Simpson, Gupt 2010; Sembiring 
& Nitivattananon 2010; Wilson, Rodic, Scheinberg 2012; 
Ezeah et al. 2013; Rutkowski and Rutkowski, 2015). Conse-
quently, some tools e.g. InteRa (Velis et al, 2012) and value 
chain analysis (Jaligot et al, 2016) have been developed to 
promote the integration of WP at WM and many interna-
tional agencies have recommended drawing lessons from 
WP initiatives to guide the development of WM policies(O-
ECD, 2016; World Bank, 2008; UN-Habitat, 2010). However, 
these initiatives are poorly understood by WM policymak-
ers and operators, who raise some negative aspects, real 
or perceived, associated with them (Gupt and Sahay 2015).
This paper aims to address the question of how these 
informal operators should be invited to work with, rather 
than against, the formal WM to reach ISWM and make cit-
ies more sustainable and inclusive. The Brazilian experi-
ence in P-EPR (BR P-EPR), where WP have been historically 
recognized as a player of the WM, is investigated using the 
EU experience in P-EPR (EU P-EPR), the first and the most 
consolidated experience in the world, as the benchmark. 
Quantitative and qualitative methods were combined to 
discuss how the two models could learn from each other to 
expand the effective recovery of MSW resources, improv-
ing the CE. An inclusive P-EPR scheme is proposed, which 
consists of the integration of the WP and their mode of 
operation in the WM in order to incorporate the respective 
economic, social and environmental benefits of that social 
technology developed by them. The advantages and chal-
lenges for the dissemination of this scheme to other LMICs 
are also highlighted. 
2. MATERIAL AND METHODS
The comparative case study focused on the P-EPR be-
cause packaging is responsible for 30 to 50% of municipal 
waste, and EPR has been a policy implemented in many 
countries to address this problem (Hwang 2007; OECD 
2016).
Initially, a systematic literature review was carried out 
to record the way in which P-EPR schemes were organ-
ized in European countries, as well as their main results. 
The scientific literature on EPR is extensive and most of 
them describe European experiences; however, no com-
prehensive systematic review was carried out to assess 
the cost-effectiveness of EPR for recycling waste, which 
was the main focus of this review. The review also covered 
gray literature. Due to the discussion of EU CE strategies 
that resulted in changes to the EU Packaging Directive and 
others, many reports on the EU P-EPR have been produced 
recently.
In addition, reports from world experiences to improve 
the WP working conditions and contribute to their inclusion 
in WM and P-EPR schemes were analyzed. This review 
aimed to complement the primary data collected on differ-
ent participatory activities carried out by the researcher and 
her partners of ORIS - Observatory of Inclusive and Solidari-
ty Recycling (Rutkowski et al 2017), in the action-research 
projects that they have been developing with Brazilian WP 
since 2012. Abstracts of 216 registrations were analyzed, 
resulting in 47 articles, reports, and theses read in full to 
complement the information in both models.
EU P-EPR data was also collected from participant ob-
servation at some professional conferences, seminars and 
lectures organized in 2019 to analyse how the changes for 
CE would impact the EU P-EPR schemes. To complete the 
understanding of the recycling model in Europe, study visits 
were made to Austria, where the P-EPR is considered effec-
tive and well implemented, and to Serbia and North Mac-
edonia, where the WP’ action is registered (Mrkajić 2018; 
Sapuric 2018). In these countries, field observation through 
technical visits to recycling facilities was carried out for a 
deeper understanding of packaging recycling processes in 
Europe, from a practical, operational, and commercial per-
spective. Data of the EU WP’ operation and main achieve-
ments were also collected by participatory observation in 
visits to the places where they operates like scrap yards, 
dumpsites and others and by some semi-structured inter-
views with some key informants (Flick 2004 ).
Quantitative results related to packaging recycling rates 
in European countries were obtained on the EUROSTAT 
website. For the quantitative analysis of the BR P-EPR 
achievements, the annual productivity and other business 
data of a group of 277 Brazilian WP cooperatives, partners 
in the Brazilian P-EPR Agreement, were analysed. The co-
operatives' data were accessed from a database formed 
by the National Association of the Brazilian WP (ANCAT), 
organized to compose a measure of the WP's participation 
in the packaging recycling index in Brazil. This is the first 
time the data has been used for research.
3. PACKAGING EXTENDED PRODUCER RE-
SPONSIBILITY SYSTEMS
The concept of EPR is based on the polluter-pays en-
vironmental principle, which implies that manufacturers 
must be charged for the life cycle of their products, includ-
ing the post-consumer stage. It should lead manufacturers 
to create take-back programs and support the reuse and 
recyclability of their products (OECD 2001). These poli-
cies generally have a target-oriented approach and not a 
command-and-control regulation. They can be implement-
ed voluntarily by producers as a “product stewardship” 
scheme or be mandatory, which is currently the case for 
packaging in many countries (OECD 2016).
EPR schemes aim to increase the recycling rates of 
targeted products and materials and encourage innovation 
on Design-for-Environment (DfE) in producers (Michaellis 
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1995; Lindhqvist & Lifset 1998; Tojo, Lindhqvist and Davis 
2001; OECD 2001). EPR leads to a change in responsibil-
ity for waste - from governments or municipalities and, 
therefore, from taxpayers to producers and distributors. In 
practice, this must mean that producers are responsible 
for the collection of used products and for the necessary 
subsequent processes like sorting and other treatments, 
for eventual recycling / reuse (EC-DGEnv 2012). In most 
cases, this responsibility is purely financial, with producers 
being obliged to finance, in whole or in part, the collection 
of recyclable waste previously under the responsibility of 
the municipalities with subsequent processes being left 
to the market. Sometimes they also have a responsibility 
to organize and carry out part or all these processes (EC-
DGEnv 2014).
Four main categories of EPR instruments are recog-
nized in different approaches and used for different prod-
ucts worldwide, as summarized in Table 1. They address 
specific aspects of WM and can be implemented simulta-
neously. The most widely used policy instruments in EPR 
are the several arrangements of take-back (72% globally), 
sometimes in combination with advance disposal rates, the 
next most used instrument (16%). Deposit / refund instru-
ments (11%) are concentrated in the beverage container 
and lead-acid battery markets, sometimes in combination 
with take-back requirements. Other EPR policy instruments 
- combined upstream taxes / subsidies, recycling content 
standards and taxes on virgin materials - appear to be used 
infrequently (OECD, 2016).
 Although EPR is, in theory, an individual obligation, 
producers often exercise their responsibility collectively. 
Most EPR schemes are operated by producers who or-
ganize or support one or more Producer Responsibility 
Organizations (PROs). These collective systems are said 
to generate economies of scale, simplify operations and re-
duce administrative burdens for consumers, retailers, and 
municipalities, reducing costs for participants (Gui et all 
2016; Mayers and Butler 2013). PROs can act in competi-
tion with each other or hold the national monopoly and can 
also manage more than one type of waste and operate in 
more than one country (Mayers 2007). There is insufficient 
empirical evidence to determine if a PRO monopoly is more 
efficient than competing ones (OECD, 2016). Moreover, it is 
more difficult (and sometimes impossible) to obtain data 
on fees, costs, and revenues when several PROs are in 
competition, raising concerns about data availability and 
system reliability (EC-DGE 2014).
These PROs can be non-profit organizations, which 
is the most common model, government agencies, qua-
si-governmental non-profit organizations, or for-profit 
companies, but in all cases, they are overseen by public 
institutions. Most PROs charge a fee directly from produc-
ers, based on a specific fee structure, and the proceeds 
are used to pay the costs of collecting, sorting and treat-
ing waste, and also administrative and managerial costs 
(Mayers and Butler 2013). PROs are also responsible for 
other tasks, such as informing citizens and waste gener-
ators about selective collection; document and prove the 
quantities of waste collected and separated for recycling; 
bidding and hiring or supervise waste operators for collec-
tion and recycling (Mayers 2007), which can be WP co-ops 
(GiZ 2018; Tearfund et al 2019).
The minimum expected requirements for a P-EPR sys-
tem must define (OECD 2016; GiZ 2018; EC-DGEnv 2014; 
OECD 2001): a) the range of products and producers in-
volved in the system; b) the parties involved in the EPR 
system and the role and responsibilities of each one; c) 
the measurement methodology, reporting system and tar-
get control methods; and, d) ensure equal treatment and 
non-discrimination between all implicated actors. 
Among the expected results of the EPR are a reduction 
in waste disposal and an increase in recycling and recov-
ery (OECD 2001; Gupt & Sahay 2015); greater cooperation 
and involvement of the private sector in WM (Černiauskaitė 
2013); achieve quantitative recycling and recovery targets 
(Cahill; Grimes & Wilson 2011; Da Cruz et al. 2014); boost 
the recycling industry and promote efficient secondary 
markets (Forslind, 2009; Hotta et al 2009; OECD 2001; 
OECD 2006).
EPR is also seen as a practical way to introduce “green 
supply chain management” to broaden the focus on re-
source efficiency (Massaruto 2014) and to help eliminate 
the cost burden for local governments on plastic waste 
(EASAC 2020). On the other hand, the impact of EPR on 
DfE and product innovation is less than expected (Atasu 
2018; OECD 2016; Wiesmeth & Häckl 2011). Although a re-
duction in the material used in packaging has been report-
ed (Hwang 2007; Gupt & Sahay 2015), innovation efforts 
have been more often directed towards classification and 
recycling techniques than towards product design (Lifset, 
Atasu &Tojo 2013; Walls 2006). Difficult recycling pack-
aging, or even non-recyclable, is still widely used in many 
goods, even long after the introduction of EPR (EC-DGEnv 
2014).
3.1 The European Extended Responsibility to the 
Packaging Producer Scheme
The EU Directive on packaging and packaging waste, 
which was approved in 1994 and updated in 2004, 2005, 
2015 and 2018, aims to limit the generation and quantities 
of packaging waste landfilled by promoting recycling, re-
use and other forms of waste recovery (PPWD 1994). This 
directive, coupled with others related to waste (Scharff 
2018), requires all EU members to define a packaging 
waste management policy to achieve mandatory recycling 
and recovery rates, as shown in Table 2. As a result, most 
EU countries have implemented selective collection of 
packaging in different waste fractions (glass, plastic, met-
al, and paper) to meet legal recycling and landfill targets.
 In response to these policies, EPR was implemented as 
an important instrument to support the European waste hi-
erarchy (EC-DGEnv 2014), and an efficient waste manage-
ment (EU 2018b). PROs were created in most EU countries 
after the first European packaging waste legislation imple-
mented in Germany in 1990. Mayers (2007) registered 114 
PROs for packaging waste organized in 29 European coun-
tries; P-EPR schemes have been implemented in 25 of the 
28 EU members (EC-DGEnv 2014) and the levy on producer 
fees for packaging has been identified in all but the UK. 
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These schemes essentially oblige packaging producers to 
financially support to varying degrees the implementation 
of packaging waste recycling (EC-DGEnv 2012). 
Some common characteristics can be observed in the 
EU EPR: 1. Normally, one operator organizes the system 
for several companies; 2. National fees based on materi-
al-ton/packing to finance cost of selective collection-waste 
sorting are paid by producers and importers; 3. Collected 
waste are sold to independent actors who classify and sell 
it to recyclers or incinerators; 4. Revenues from sales of 
secondary material help offset the financial contributions 
of producers and importers to EPR schemes. Figure 1 
schematically represents this model.
Producers generally join national collective compliance 
schemes, organizing producer responsibility organizations 
(PROs) to be the operator of EPR requirements. PROs differ 
mainly in terms of organizational structure, specific opera-
tions, costs and reporting requirements, but they all serve 
the same basic function. The recycling, logistics and waste 
companies hired by the PROs carry out daily operations to 
EPR Instruments Usual approach Way of implementation Examples
Product take-back requirements Recycling and collection targets 
defined for a product or material
Mandatory or voluntary Most used scheme in the World, 
high transaction costs
Regulations and performance 
standards
Minimum recycled content on new 
products
Mandatory standards or applied 
by industries themselves through 
voluntary programmes
Some companies’ decision: 100% 
recycled plastic bottles by 2025
Information-based instruments Reporting requirements, labelling 
of products to communicate 
consumers about waste separation, 
and recyclers about raw materials 
in products
Mandatory standards or applied 
by industries themselves through 
voluntary programmes
Recyclability symbols in packaging
Economic and market-based 
instruments
Deposit-refund (DRS) Previous deposit is fully or partially 
refunded when the product is 
returned to a specified location
Bottles deposit machine in retailers
Advanced Disposal Fees (ADF) Fees at purchase based on the 
estimated costs of collection and 
treatment, that may be collected by 
public or private entities and used to 
finance post-consumer treatment of 
some products
Used in 17% of the schemes in the 
World (PROs)
Material taxes Taxes on virgin materials or difficult 
to recycle materials to create incen-
tives to use secondary (recycled) or 
less toxic materials
Appropriated for shifting innovation 
in design
Upstream combination tax/subsidy 
(UCTS)
Tax paid by producers subsequently 
used to subsidise waste treatment
Associated to DfE, but less used
Source: Elaborated by the author from OECD 2001; 2016
TABLE 1: EPR instruments, approaches and way of implementation used worldwide.
Waste classification

























2008 55% 60% 60% 22,5% 60% 50% 50% 15%
PPWD
2025 65% (2) 75% 50% 70% 70% 50% 25%
PPWD









(1) Landfill ban on separately collected plastic, metal, glass, paper, cardboard and biowaste. Target to be redefined after 2024. (2) Incinerated packaging can´t 
anymore be counted in the recycling/ recovered targets (3) Equal to the amount of packaging placed on the market. Source: Elaborated by the author from 
Scharff 2018; WFD 1998; PPWD 1994; EU 2018; EU 2018a; EU 2018b.
TABLE 2: Recycle and reuse targets for packaging regarding the current EU Directives - Packaging and Packaging Waste Directive (PPWD) 
and Waste Framework Directive (WFD) updated with Circular Economy Package.
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ensure that packaging is collected at designated munici-
pal collection points and treated as needed. PROs recover 
their costs from producers either through flat rates or by 
allocating actual costs according to the relative quanti-
ty of products each producer sells over a period - usually 
semi-annually or annually. Most of the time PRO collection 
services are provided by public WM services, run by local 
authorities (LA) and sorting services are provided by recy-
cling companies. However, in some cases, there is a “dual 
system” when PROs and municipalities manage separate 
collection systems. In others, the LA act also as providers 
of sorting waste packaging for the PROs, directly or by sub-
contractors. 
The EPR system is considered a factor that boosted the 
recycling industry in Europe and is also considered impor-
tant for financing selective collection of waste which, for 
operational reasons, is generally more expensive than a 
conventional collection (EC-DGEnv 2014). It is considered 
also pivotal for achieving the EU packaging waste recycling 
targets (EU 2018b). The role of PROs has become impor-
tant in its implementation since they provide an interface 
for organizing financial transactions, waste collections, 
and communications between governments, producers, 
waste treatment companies, retailers, and more than 
80,000 municipalities in Europe.
The packaging recycling indices are calculated annu-
ally by comparing the total weight of packaging waste en-
tering recycling operations with the quantity of packaging 
placed on the market in each Member State (MS) and for 
each packaging raw material. In an attempt to achieve the 
principles of the CE, increasing recycling targets were re-
cently defined for Municipal and packaging waste as well 
as for all packaging raw material but aluminum(Table 2).
The EPR scheme operation has common features in 
EU MS, but small differences can also be observed. For 
each operation model and different geographic / land-
scape conditions, the measured / estimated cost for the 
full cost of collection, classification and treatment of selec-
tively collected packaging waste may be different as well 
as the fees. This cost may also include costs for handling 
packaging-containing commingled waste; for public infor-
mation and awareness to ensure consumer participation 
in the scheme; for litter prevention and management; and 
costs related to the enforcement and surveillance of the 
EPR system, which includes audits and measures against 
“free-riders” (EC-DGEnv 2012).
In the Austrian EPR system, for instance, fees must cov-
er the costs of collecting packaging in commingled waste, 
while in the UK, they cover only 10% of the total cost for 
packaging waste collection and recycling (EC-DGEnv 2014). 
In Germany, PRO bears the total cost to collect packaging 
due to the choice of a “dual” system; in the Netherlands, 
the full cost is covered in the WM bill, while most countries 
have adopted a cost-sharing mechanism between produc-
ers and WM public services (Massaruto 2014). In Belgium, 
LA are reimbursed for a defined frequency and density of 
collection and in France, P-EPR is supposed to cover 80% 
of a ‘net optimised costs’ system, the reference costs are 
based on the optimal functioning of the collection and sort-
ing operations (EC-DGEnv 2014). Da Cruz et al (2014) and 
Da Cruz, Simões and Marques (2014) failed to evidence 
that the industry bears all the costs of managing and recy-
cling packaging waste in any of the EU countries analysed.
In addition, as shown in Figure 2, there seems to be no 
FIGURE 1: EU P-EPR operational model (LA = Local Authorities) Source: adapted from EUROPEN, 2014.
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direct correlation between the fees paid and the recycling 
rates obtained. It is also difficult to compare the cost-ef-
fectiveness due to the lack of transparency regarding the 
financial aspects and the technical performance of the 
EPR schemes. The amount of waste generated, collected 
and treated is hardly comparable between MS, because 
they are calculated in different ways, with quality issues; 
costs are not always aggregated on a national scale; data 
on quantities of packaging placed on the market, financial 
information and flows are not always available, as well as 
information on fees paid by producers and the costs they 
must cover (EC-DGEnv 2014).
There are also different scopes in the P-EPR between 
EU countries - some cover only household packaging 
waste, while in other countries commercial and industrial 
packaging waste can also count towards recycling targets 
(Cahill, Grimes and Wilson 2011). Commercial and industri-
al packaging waste is known to be easier to collect and sort 
(Massaruto 2014; EEA 2005), which reinforces criticisms 
about the accuracy of comparing recycling rates in EU MS 
(Hogg et al 2018). Concentrating efforts on commercial 
and industrial waste also raises concerns, since it is in the 
domestic flow that most of the packaging recycling chal-
lenges lie (Lerpeniere & Cook 2018). Other environmental 
criticisms arise because fees are not based on principles 
of ecological modulation. Although the rates are different 
for different raw materials, the fee diversification does not 
consider detailed information on the recycling of subfrac-
tions. For example, there is a single fee for all kind of plas-
tics, although eco-modulated P-EPR rates should penalize 
the use of plastics that are difficult to recycle (Brouillat & 
Oltra 2012).
3.2 Brazilian Packaging Extended Producer Respon-
sibility: an inclusive scheme 
Brazil, Argentina, Ecuador, Colombia and several coun-
tries in Latin America and the Caribbean (LAC), including 
the OECD´s members Chile and Mexico, recently took steps 
to implement their first P-EPR systems. In these countries 
and in other LMIC countries, the recycling of waste depends 
on the action of the WP, which is the main and most visible 
part of the so-called Informal Recycling Sector (IRS).
In Brazil, the recognition of waste pickers as workers 
"recyclable material pickers" was defined by law in 2002 
and, since then, some public policies have been developed 
to integrate the WP into the formal economy. The Brazil-
ian Solid Waste Policy (PNRS in Portuguese), approved in 
2010, defines a hierarchy for the treatment of waste, rec-
ognizes waste as a resource of economic and social value 
and ratifies WP cooperatives (WP co-ops), the main repre-
sentative of the IRS in Brazil, as an important player of the 
urban waste recycling process. 
As usual in other countries, the selective collection of 
domestic solid waste in Brazil is part of the public sani-
tation and urban cleaning services, under the responsibil-
ity of LA. LA can hire private service operators to provide 
these services, which can be a company or a WP co-op, but 
only WP co-ops can be contracted without public bidding.
The PNRS (2010) prohibits the landfilling of recyclable 
waste and defines producer compliance for some hazard-
ous waste, including packaging. The packaging life cycle 
is under “shared responsibility”: LA must offer selective re-
cyclable collection as part of municipal WM and citizens 
must dispose of recyclable materials separately from oth-
er waste. Citizens can also be charged with waste fees. 
Manufacturers, importers, distributors, and traders must 
encourage and maximize reuse and recycling, improving 
the design of their products and manufacturing process-
es. They also need to comply the diversion of packaging to 
landfills, through an agreement with the states and feder-
al governments. This "reverse logistics" system, as it was 
called in the legislation, should be implemented in partner-
ship with the WP co-ops. 
Although urban waste collection is carried out in al-
most 100% of Brazilian municipalities, selective waste 
collection is poorly implemented despite the PNRS. Less 
FIGURE 2: Recycling rates (%) of paper, plastic, metal and glass household packaging in some EU countries (right axis) and average fees 
charged to packaging producers (€) per ton of packaging put on the market(left axis), based on the average share of paper, plastic and 
glass in total waste packaging (domestic and industrial /commercial) in the EU-28, year of 2016. EU-28 (¹) represents the average recy-
cling rate for EU-28 countries. Source: Elaborated by the author from EC-DGEnv 2014; EUROSTAT, 2019.
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than 40% of municipalities have implemented this service, 
which reaches all households in less than 10% of them.
This results that only 4.1% of the 62.8 million tons of waste 
generated annually in Brazil - 2.6 million tons / year which 
represents around 14% of the total recyclable waste- is col-
lected selectively (SNIS 2018). However, industries in Bra-
zil report significant recycling rates for several recyclable 
waste (Rutkowski & Rutkowski 2017) which are growing 
each year (IBGE 2015). The PET recycling rate in Brazil, 
for example, is reported to be higher than in the USA and 
many EU countries; according to the industry, 83% of recy-
cled PET is supplied by WP co-ops (ABIPET 2016; ABIPET 
2019). In most Brazilian cities, selective collection of waste 
is provided or depends on the WP co-ops' initiative, without 
the support of LA. 
The Brazilian waste recycling supply chain can be de-
scribed as consisting of two parts (Figure 3) (Rutkowski 
2008). The most visible component is a "value chain", in 
which recyclable material becomes the raw material for 
paper, plastic, etc production chain. This chain depends on 
a "service chain" needed to transform mixed waste mate-
rials into a resource (Scheinberg&Simpson 2015). WP co-
ops play a valuable role in these two chains and are at the 
intersection between them (Rutkowski&Rutkowski 2017). 
This way of action, known in Brazil as ‘Solidarity Selective 
Collection’ (CSS in Portuguese initials), has been observed 
also in other LMIC (Ferronato et al 2019; Giovannini &Huy-
brechts 2017; Batista et al 2018; Scheinberg et al. 2016; 
Nahman 2010).
CSS is a "social" technology built from the WP's prac-
tical knowledge and skills, organized in a Social and Soli-
darity Economy framework (Rutkowski & Rutkowski 2015; 
Lima et al 201; Gutberlet 2009). Through CSS, WP co-ops 
divert household packaging from landfills for recycling. 
Door-to-door CSS expands the selective packaging collec-
tion route, increases the volumes collected, reduces oper-
ating costs and reduces GHG emissions (King & Gutberlet 
2013). WP co-ops also raise people's awareness to carry 
on better separation of recyclables through recycling edu-
cation, which includes letting them know that the material 
will be turned into income for WP families (Rutkowski & 
Rutkowski 2015). In WP co-ops´ sheds, packaging is man-
ually classified into more than 20 different subcategories, 
using visual and tactile sorting skills and adjusted to the 
quality requirements of secondary material buyers, which 
implies a substantial and sophisticated contribution to 
waste recycling (Purshouse et al 2017).
In some large cities, private cleaning companies con-
tracted by LA are responsible for collecting recyclable 
waste from door to door (SNIS 2018), and WP co-ops are 
FIGURE 3: Waste recycling supply chain in Brazil. Blue line marks the service waste management chain and the red one marks the value 
recycling chain. They are interconnected by the WP co-ops that play paramount roles in both. Source: Rutkowski 2008; Rutkowski&Rut-
kowski 2017.
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responsible for the sorting, packaging, storage, marketing 
of the material, acting as non-automated Material Recy-
cling Facilities (MRF) (Purshouse et al. 2017).The packag-
ing can also be recovered, even if they have been discarded 
by householders without prior separation. In these cases, 
the autonomous and independent "street WP" picks them 
in trash bins and, using their carts or big bags, takes them 
to WP co-ops´ sheds or to scrap yards. In many cities, a 
smartphone app offers a connection service between res-
idents and the street WP for donations of recyclable ma-
terials. Scrap yards act as intermediary businesses in the 
recycling value chain, collecting recyclable materials also 
from commercial and industrial organizations, sometimes 
buying these materials, sometimes receiving them as do-
nations in exchange for offering a waste correct disposal 
(Rutkowski &Rutkowski 2017). 
BR P-EPR schemes were organized considering this 
context and recycling actors, as shown in Figure 4 (CEM-
PRE, 2018). LA is not directly involved in the system, al-
though in many cities WP co-ops work in partnership with 
them. Producers provide financial support to WP co-ops, 
which report them data related to recyclable materials 
marketed to compose recycling targets. Packaging pro-
ducers also implement a "dual" system to receive volun-
tary delivery of recyclable materials (PEVs in Portuguese 
initials) and to promote information to improve citizens 
willingness to recycle. The Brazilian Government's Envi-
ronmental System is responsible for controlling targets 
achievement.
The relationship between some large packaging com-
panies and WP co-ops has been experienced at LAC since 
the first decade of the 2000s (IRR 2018; Fernandes 2016). 
These companies have offered support to WP co-ops 
through social-environmental responsibility actions. This 
model has been replicated in different countries (DANONE 
ECOSYSTEM 2016). The BR P-EPR scheme, implemented 
in 2015 by an agreement between a coalition formed by 
about 4000 companies from 22 different business sectors 
and the BR government, was based on these experiences 
and contributed to formalize the model (Demajorovic & 
Massote 2017; IRR 2018a). The goal was to reduce pack-
aging waste disposal in landfills by 22% and increase the 
recovery of dry waste fraction by 20% compared to the sit-
uation in 2013. The target for landfill diversion must be 45% 
by 2031. The agreement also aims to improve the capacity 
of WP co-ops, increasing the efficiency and productivity of 
the recycling sector (CEMPRE 2018).
In BR P-EPR experiences, companies finance non-gov-
ernmental organizations (NGOs) to offer technical assis-
tance and invest resources in the infrastructure of WP co-
ops, such as building retrofits, maintenance and purchases 
of machines and trucks. In return, WP co-ops provide in-
formation on the monthly amount of recyclables sold. The 
financial resources offered by producers are negotiated 
directly between them and the NGOs and are usually not 
related to the amounts recycled or to the costs of WP ser-
vices, but they usually cover the costs and revenues of the 
NGO's operations. NGOs and producers vary in the way 
they support WP co-ops. ANCAT coordinates the largest 
experience of the BR P-EPR and organized a national bid-
ding process to choose which WP co-ops would receive 
financial and technical support each year. In 2019, 277 co-
operatives were supported in the P-EPR scheme managed 
by ANCAT, corresponding to 22,5% of the 1232 WP co-ops 
registered on the Brazilian Sanitation Information System 
(SNIS in Portuguese initials) (SNIS 2018).
FIGURE 4: Flow diagram and actors involved on Brazilian P-EPR. Orange line marks the action field of P-EPR. Source: CEMPRE 2018.
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The traceability of the BR P-EPR scheme managed by 
ANCAT is provided by sales invoices from the WP co-ops 
registered in a database, implemented in 2017. This data-
base also includes information on the WP's income and the 
material selling prices. This database was the basis for the 
first Brazilian Recycling Yearbook, launched in 2019, which 
aims to annually record the WP’ contribution to recycling 
in Brazil. This was a remarkable innovation because it is 
extremely difficult to quantify the IRS’ contribution to recy-
cling (Burcea 2015).
The ANCAT database records that, from 2017 to 2019, 
WP co-ops diverted 168,101 tons of recyclables from 
waste, yielding a cumulative cost savings of more than U$ 
4.0 Million to municipalities and providing additional ser-
vices worth another U$ 20.3 Million (ANCAT 2020). In 2019 
WP co-ops recycled 9.9% of all packaging market in com-
panies involved in one of the P-EPR programs managed by 
ANCAT, the “Recycle for Brazil” program (ANCAT 2020). 
ANCAT data also disclose that WP co-ops had an average 
productivity of 48.2 tons / month, representing an average 
physical productivity of 3.48 tons / month for each WP. This 
productivity is three times greater than that recorded in the 
literature for an average autonomous picker, who is said to 
collect and recycle about 40-50 kg of recyclable waste daily 
(Chen et al. 2018). 
Data coming from other BR P-EPR experiences also 
reveal impressive results. The database of the initiative 
“Novo Ciclo” manage by the NGO INSEA registered that 
77% of PET packaging and 17% of PS packaging marketed 
in by Danone in Brazil in 2017 were collected and treated 
by WP co-ops (INSEA 2018), and SNIS registered that WP 
co-ops collected 30.7% of the household waste diverted for 
recycling in Brazil in 2018 (SNIS 2018).
Figure 5 shows the materials treated by the WP co-ops 
supported by ANCAT and the respective revenue obtained 
from different recyclable materials. Note, for example, that 
although plastic represents just 17% of the amount of re-
cyclable material sold, this material provides 37% of sales 
revenue.
ANCAT (2020) records 17 different types of products 
marketed as metals, 9 different types of paper and card-
board, including aseptic carton packs, 7 types of glass, 22 
different types of plastics and 10 types of electro-electron-
ic waste. There are also different selling prices for these 
materials, depending on the geographic region of collec-
tion and trade (Table 3). The South and Southeast regions 
are those where selective collection is more widely im-
plemented (SNIS 2018) which should improve the quality 
of the recyclables, but the differences in the sale prices 
of recyclable materials can also be related to the market 
context and the recycling industry in each of these regions 
(Rutkowski & Rutkowski 2017).
Figure 6 shows the results of the BR P-EPR scheme 
related to improving the operational capacity of WP co-
ops, in three different phases in the timeline. Phase I in-
dicates the baseline diagnosis of the cooperatives when 
the P-EPR scheme was started; Phase II is the diagnostic 
in 2018 and Phase III the situation in 2019. The conditions 
of management and operation of the WP co-ops, which 
are self-managed companies organized under the Social 
and Solidarity Economy (SSE), have been continuously im-
proved in all seven aspects monitored. The financial assis-
tance received contributed to improve working conditions, 
operational and workforce management and, consequent-
ly, their overall productivity. Many cooperatives could be 
legalized due to better administrative organization, regu-
larized accounting procedures and settlement of eventual 
debts, which, in turn, facilitated their relationship with the 
recycling sector, LA and other partners. The financial and 
administrative stability also contributed to the systemati-
zation and strengthening of its internal self-management 
procedures.
FIGURE 5: Composition of the packaging waste traded and composition of the revenue obtained by the WP co-ops, between 2017 and 
2019, in percentages of each recyclable material traded among the total quantities traded and percentages of aggregate revenue for each 
material to the total revenue obtained by WP co-ops. Source: Elaborated by the author from ANCAT (2020).
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The support for administrative improvement in WP co-
ops was considered essential to increase WP's income and 
the ability to be contracted as public service providers. WP 
generally have an extremely low school experience - 17% of 
the WP in the supported cooperatives are illiterate and 60% 
have less than 4 years of schooling (ANCAT 2019). Low 
schooling prohibits most WPs from knowing and using 
management techniques and tools (Rutkowski 2008), con-
sidered essential to ensure traceability of P-EPR schemes 
and control of the waste services offered (Gutberlet 2015; 
Demajorovic & Massote 2017). This knowledge is neces-
sary to facilitate dialogue and networking with waste man-
agement and recycling companies (Rutkowski 2013) and, 
therefore, the inclusion of WP in formal WM and EPR sys-
tems. 
Financial support from producers partially addresses 
the lack of access to working capital, a major problem 
faced by cooperatives in many LMICs (Gutberlet 2009; 
Rutkowski 2013). WPs organized in cooperatives share 
activities and responsibilities, which leads to better busi-
ness management and better working conditions, allow-
ing them not to have to work in unsanitary conditions, 
in dumps or on the streets as before (Demajorovic et al. 
2014; Gutberlet 2015). They can sell recyclable materials 
in better conditions than they could as individuals (Medina, 
2000; Gonçalves-Dias and Teodósio 2006; Rutkowski&Rut-
kowski 2017); they reduce the transaction costs of their 
activities (Rutkowski 2013), doing so under a technology 
that proves to be energy efficient and socially and envi-
ronmentally sound (Gunsilius et al. 2011; King & Gutber-
let 2013). They are also empowered by being involved in 
waste management and recycling chains preserving their 
livelihood (Gutberlet 2008; Gunsilius et al. 2011; Rutkowski 
& Rutkowski 2015; Dias, 2016). This support, therefore, 
helps to increase not only the WP co-ops sustainability but 
could increase the productivity and overall efficiency of the 
waste recycling system, improving the ability of producers 
to meet the packaging recycling targets and their commit-
ments for recycling plastics worldwide. 
Region Metal (US$/ton) Paper (US$/ton) Plastic (US$/ton) Glass (US$/ton)
South 172,37 103,93 253,49 20,28
Southeast 205,32 116,60 266,16 25,35
North 154,63 65,91 218,00 38,02
Center-West 154,63 81,12 197,72 5,07
Northeast 215,46 86,19 263,62 22,81
Brazil (average) 182,51 98,86 240,81 20,28
Source: Elaborated by the author from ANCAT 2020
TABLE 3: Average selling price of recyclable materials in each Brazilian region in 2019. Bold values highlight the highest and smallest 
selling price got for each material.
FIGURE 6: Evaluation of the management and operational capacity of the WP co-ops, in three distinct phases. Phase I indicates the coop-
eratives’ baseline diagnosis when the P-EPR scheme was started; Phase II is the situation diagnosed in 2018 and Phase III is the situation 
in 2019.Source: ANCAT 2020.
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4. LEARNING FROM TWO MODELS FOR AN 
EQUITABLE AND INCLUSIVE EXTENDED 
PRODUCERS RESPONSIBILITY FOR PACK-
AGING SCHEME
4.1 Comparing the EU and Brazil P-EPR models
Table 4 summarizes the main characteristics of the two 
models — the organizational similarities and the different 
approaches, such as the roles of the stakeholders. It is 
noteworthy that although organized in a country of conti-
nental dimensions, the BR P-EPR scheme operates without 
a PRO having been organized and without involvement of 
the LA. The traceability of the data raises criticism in both 
systems. Also, in both, EPR schemes help to reduce WM 
costs but do not bear the full cost. It was not possible to 
say which one is less costly to companies and which is 
Aspect EU P-EPR BR P-EPR
Principles Polluter pays principle and Circular Economy are clearly 
expressed in legislation 
Polluter pays principle is expressed in law but although waste 
hierarchy is cited, there is no mention to CE.
Legal Framework Directive 94/62/EC and amendments
Directive 2008/98/EC and amendments
PNRS- Law 12.305/2010, Decree 7.404/2010, Decree 7.217/ 
2010, Sanitation Law nº 11.455/2007
Targets Related to % of recycled packaging waste: 50% of munici-
pal waste and 55% of packaging waste should be recycled 
/ reused;
Related to% of packaging waste disposed of in landfills and% 
of the fraction of dry waste recovery: reduce packaging waste 
disposal in landfills by 22% recovery: reduce packaging waste 
disposal in landfills by 22% and increase the recovery of dry 
waste fraction by 20% compared to the situation in 2013.
Role of producers Producers must organize and / or finance the collection, 
transport, and pre-treatment processes necessary for 
recycling packaging waste. For this, they pay fees defined 
for each material and calculated according to the quantity 
of packaging sold by each producer.
They must also provide information for recycling on their 
packaging.
Producers provide financial support for technical assistance 
and for improving the infrastructure of WP co-ops to increase 
their productivity in the processes of collection, transportation 
and pre-treatment for recycling. They are also responsible for 
implementing points for voluntary packaging delivery (PEVs), in 
addition to providing consumers with information for packaging 
recycling.
Role of LA LA are legally responsible for waste management and 
for organizing municipal selective collection. In most 
countries, they receive financial support from producers to 
send packaging for recycling.
LA are legally responsible for waste management, however, in 
most cities, there is no municipal selective collection. LA is not 
directly involved in the scheme, although in some cities WP co-
ops have service provider contracts with LA or have agreements 




The collection service is done by public or private waste 
collection service providers hired by LA
In most cities, WP co-ops and autonomous WP do the collec-
tion. In the biggest cities, the selective collection is done by 
private service providers hired by LA.
Pre-treatment processes 
for packaging recycling
Pre-treatment processes for packaging recycling operated 
by private companies. Sometimes these processes are 
operated at facilities owned by LA.
In most cities, this service is operated by WP co-ops and there is 
an agreement between them and LA.
Role of PROs PROs, organized in different EU's member states, are 
financed by fees paid by all or a large part of companies 
in an industry but have financial and administrative 
independence from them. PROS contract collection and 
pre-treatment services for packaging waste from LA and 
private companies and are also responsible for recording 
and controlling recycling data.
No PRO organized. Companies act individually, contracting 
NGOs for intermediating relations with WP co-ops and LA. Most 
of companies act collectively by mean of their industrial sector 
association or forming coalitions.
Reporting and moni-
toring
Each country has a third part responsible by monitoring 
recycling data reported by PROs to Government Environ-
ment Department. 
Annual reports on goals and results are presented by compa-
nies or their coalitions to Government Environment Departments 
and published on websites.
Data traceability of the 
recycling targets
Not available to the public for alleged commercial 
reasons. The accuracy of the applied measurement meth-
odologies is questioned, pointed out as not comparable 
between countries.
Not available to the public for alleged commercial reasons,  re-
cords based on the sales invoice for waste packaging treated as 
raw material, easily controllable, but probably registered below 
the real due to an informal market and the lack of registration 
and control capacity in WP co-ops.
System financial flow 
and surveillance
PROs transfer part of the resources paid by producers to 
service providers, reducing expenses with waste manage-
ment in the municipalities, but without covering 100% of 
the packaging collection costs. The scheme is also con-
sidered to encourage investments in the recycling chain. 
The fees paid by companies are defined by the PROs and 
therefore competition between the PROs is encouraged. 
The financial surveillance of the system is carried out by 
the stakeholders of the PROs. Cost- effectiveness not 
measured.
Expenses with waste management in the municipalities are in-
directly reduced by the action of WP co-ops, which reduces the 
costs of collecting municipal waste and disposal. The scheme 
also encourages investments in the recycling chain since WP 
co-ops are an essential link to feed the chain. Companies 
define how much is transferred to NGOs that define values to 
be transferred to WP co-ops, but these values are not related to 
actual costs. No financial surveillance of the system is reported. 
Cost-effectiveness not measured.
Free riders’ control Most of the countries have specific legislation and ways 
of acting, none of them reported as 100% effective
Legislation oblige all producers to participate on the scheme 
whereas no enforcement mechanism is defined. Some state 
governments have proposed specific controls recently.
Source: Elaborated by the author
TABLE 4: Summarized main characteristics of the two studied P- EPR models.
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more cost-effective for recycling targets.
 Municipal waste recycling targets differ considerably 
between the two schemes. First, the BR P-EPR is more 
recent than the EU P-EPR, as usual, the BR P-EPR starts 
with modest goals that should grow over time. Second, few 
municipalities practice selective waste collection and there 
are no information, education, and awareness programs for 
the separation of recyclable materials at the source in op-
eration, either by the LA or by EPR schemes. Consequently, 
a small percentage of municipal waste is diverted from the 
landfill for recycling by formal WM systems. Even so, the in-
dustry registers considerable levels of recycling of papers, 
metals, and some types of plastics, whose responsibility it 
attributes to the action of the WP (Rutkowski&Rutkowski 
2017; CEMPRE 2018). 
 In addition, the share of recyclable waste in the compo-
sition of urban waste is greater in the EU MS than in LMIC, 
as shown in Figure 7. However, although in LMIC, organ-
ic matter is the largest fraction of waste, the composition 
of recyclables collected and treated by WP co-ops (P WP) 
approximates the composition of EU MS packaging waste 
(PW EU), as shown in Figure 8. For comparison purposes, 
this Figure also shows the average percentage of recycla-
bles that make up municipal waste in Brazil (W BR). Thus, 
concerning the CE perspective, the inclusive P-EPR scheme 
seems capable to add beneficial innovations to the P-EPR. 
As shown in Table 3, the average price of plastics is 2.5 
times that of paper but 64% of the materials marketed by 
the WP co-ops is paper, which makes up 13.1% of MSW; 
while 17% of the materials marketed by the WP co-ops are 
plastics, which makes up 13.5% of MSW, but provides 37% 
of WP co-ops’ revenue (Figure 5). Despite of WP co-ops 
efforts to recycle plastics, they have been more effective 
in recycling paper. In fact, they are limited by household-
er separation, which is much more efficient for paper than 
for plastics due to a lack of environmental education. Not-
withstanding, WP co-ops value a greater number of sub-
categories of materials, including plastics, responding to 
the specific needs of buyers in the recycling industry (Pur-
shouse et al. 2017). They also know better than LAs how to 
work with the value chains and market the materials (GiZ 
2018a).
 Typical MRFs in the EU MS usually classify a variety 
of nine commingled collected materials: corrugated card-
board, newsprint, magazines, and mixed paper make up the 
paper fraction; the metal fraction is made up of aluminum 
and ferrous metal. The plastic fraction is composed mainly 
of HDPE (high-density polyethylene), bottles and pots of PP 
(polypropylene) and PET (WRAP 2015). For glass, in most 
EU countries, the main method of collection and classifica-
tion is the single flow “bring bank” system (WRAP 2006). 
On the other hand, as described in Section 3.2, the output 
of the WP co-ops consists of 55 different recyclables sub-
fractions (ANCAT 2020). 
There are significant differences between the PW EU 
and P WP plastic waste subfractions, as shown in Figure 
9. Inclusive P-EPR schemes recover different types of plas-
tics but EU P-EPR prioritizes the valuable ones. In the EU 
MRFs, 3 types of most valuable plastics (PET, HDPE, and 
PP) compose 80% of the plastic treated and ¼ of the ma-
terial is unidentified, which means that will be transformed 
in refused material to recycling. However, WP co-ops sort 
11 different plastic subfractions to be recycled. PET, HDPE, 
and PP represents 56% of the plastic fraction treated by 
them.
The outputs of the EU MRF are defined by technolog-
ical restrictions imposed by the automated process they 
employ, which, in turn, will influence the selective collection 
implemented by the LA. The capacity of contracted MRFs 
will also define the information provided to consumers on 
what should be separated in each region. The profit rates of 
the recycling businesses are an important factor for the or-
ganization of the system, as they directly impact the costs 
to be paid by packaging producers. In turn, WP normally 
collects all available recyclable materials, be it plastic, pa-
FIGURE 7: Waste composition in different countries. Source: Alfaia 
et al. 2017.
FIGURE 8: Comparison of packaging waste composition in the EU 
(PW EU), packaging waste marketed by WP co-ops (P WP), and the 
average percentage of recyclable materials that make up  Brazilian 
municipal waste (W BR) for the main recyclable materials. Source: 
Elaborated by the author from ANCAT 2020, Eurostat 2019, CEM-
PRE 2018.
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per, metals, electronics, furniture, clothing and even used 
frying oil. They are interested in collecting and preparing 
for sale as much material as possible, since their income 
comes from what they sell, usually at tiny prices. WP de-
scribe themselves as "environmental agents" committed 
to increasing waste recycling rates. Organized under SSE 
framework, WP enterprises are based on values such as 
cooperation, solidarity, trust, self-management, and the 
feeling of belonging to a common social condition (Rut-
kowski, 2008; Gutberlet 2015). WP do not just evaluate 
their businesses in terms of cost-benefit analysis. 
In developed countries economic market concerns 
have been the main drivers of waste recycling rules (Ro-
goff and Ross, 2016). However, market-driven actions are 
usually not the most efficient in environmental and social 
terms; recycling can remain stagnant if supported only by 
market forces. To meet the objectives of the CE, as much 
of any recyclable material as possible must be separated 
from the waste and sent for recycling. In the inclusive mod-
el, a wide range of packaging is being effectively recycled 
due to the modus operandi of the WP. 
The BR P-EPR system is operating independently from 
LA and without a centralized operator. In Europe, the sys-
tem depends on the organization of PROs, often criticized 
for lack of transparency in their actions and for environ-
mental results below expectations, such as those related 
to green innovation, DfE and waste flow treated (EASAC 
2020; Lerpeniere & Cook 2018; EC-DGEnv 2014; Massaru-
to 2014; da Cruz, Simões & Marques 2014; Mayers&Butler 
2013; Brouillat & Oltra 2012). On the other hand, in most 
developing countries, LA have not been able to implement 
WM efficiently. Therefore, the inclusive scheme is provid-
ing a simpler operation to P-EPR that can be considered an 
easier system for deployment and dissemination in similar 
situations. 
Nevertheless, in the long run, the system cannot ignore 
the LA that are legally responsible for WM. As proposed in 
some EU MS, producers must reimburse LA for the cost 
of packaging collection. In turn, LA must not ignore that 
subcontracting the WP co-ops as providers of selective 
collection services benefits WM, reducing costs, amplify-
ing the efficiency of municipal selective collection, and im-
proving the quality of collected material. On the other hand, 
WP co-ops have also added benefits to the recycling value 
chain, amplifying resource recovery when performing MRF 
services. Therefore, the choice of producers to include WP 
co-ops as agents in P-EPR schemes should also be encour-
aged.
Finally, EPR is an environmental policy approach that 
should also develop Design for Environment (DfE) activi-
ties and innovation for reduce packaging waste genera-
tion. Neither of the two P-EPR models showed evidence 
of achieving these objectives. In the Brazilian scheme, DfE 
was not ever mentioned. On the other side, across EU, be-
tween 2013 and 2015, the amount of packaging waste gen-
erated grew by 6% suggesting that more effort on waste 
prevention is needed (EASAC, 2020). An eco-modulation 
fee to be paid by producers has been suggested as a le-
ver to encourage eco-packaging design at EU-EPR. Regu-
lations in this direction are in place in Germany and under 
regulation in Italy and France (Scharff 2018). Further stud-
ies on these experiences should indicate their validity to 
reduce waste generation and improve the use of resources 
in packaging.
4.2 Proposing an equitable and inclusive P-EPR 
model 
Performance of EPR schemes are influenced by many 
factors as population density and country geography; his-
torical development of the waste management infrastruc-
ture and existence of complementary waste policy instru-
ments (pay-as-you-throw schemes and landfill taxes, for 
instance); the value of secondary materials on the national 
market; awareness and willingness of citizens to partici-
pate on the waste recycling effort (EC-DGEnv 2014).When 
the P-EPR was established in Europe, most municipalities 
already run well-organized waste management systems 
and the recycling market was incipient. In this context, the 
producer's financial resources were used to encouraged 
private sector’s investment in the recycling industry and to 
modernize waste collection systems through the addition 
of technology, which resulted in increased operating costs 
FIGURE 9: Plastic packaging sorting composition in EU MRFs (left) and WP MRFs (right). Source: Elaborated by the author from WRAP 
2006; ANCAT 2020.
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(OECD 2016). However, recent studies showed that the de-
cision to implement EPR schemes in some EU countries 
without considering the IRS prevented the system from 
achieving its objectives (OECD 2016; Scheinberg et al. 
2016; Mrkajić et al. 2018; Wiesmeth et al. 2018; Ferronato 
et al. 2019).
On the other hand, in LMIC, LA cannot afford expen-
sive waste management systems (UN HABITAT 2010; Giz 
2018a; Ferronato et al 2019). As waste management for 
recycling is poorly implemented by LA, the waste recycling 
system has been developed based on WP's social technol-
ogy (Scheinberg 2012; Rutkowski & Rutkowski 2015). In ad-
dition, LMIC has an abundant workforce, which in the most 
can not be employed in modern technological industries 
and services. The inclusive recycling schemes then ap-
pear as an "appropriate technology" (Schumacher 1973), a 
technologically accessible, labour-intensive, autonomous, 
decentralized option for upgrading WM in these countries. 
Another interesting innovation observed in the BR 
P-EPR scheme related to CE is providing mutual learning 
and support for both stakeholders in relation to recycling 
issues. Producers can better understand the challenges of 
recyclability because WP are able to clearly indicate which 
materials cannot be recycled due to restrictions from the 
market. This information has helped producers to take 
measures to improve the recyclability of their packaging 
(Demajorovic & Massote 2017; DANONE ECOSYSTEM, 
2016). Waste pickers, in turn, improved their learning about 
the recycling industry, due to the opportunities created by 
packaging producers to overlap with intermediaries in the 
recycling value chain. Nationally organized into coopera-
tive networks, Brazilian WP are transforming their position 
in the recycling sector. This type of learning and networking 
between different economic groups is an interesting inno-
vation and support for new approaches required for the Cir-
cular and Green economies around the world.
Thus, the modernization of the WM in the LMIC must 
be made from the improvements in the conditions of the 
WP in operating the CSS. Figure 10 summarizes the ben-
efits that the inclusion of WP co-ops could bring to cities 
towards an integrated and sustainable WM. Due to the im-
provement of the municipal WM and the livelihoods of a 
vulnerable urban population, the scheme results in an af-
fordable and efficient alternative for the implementation of 
ISWM in emerging countries.
Figure 11 represents schematically a proposal for an 
equitable and inclusive P-EPR. The formalization of WP co-
ops as a provider of municipal selective waste collection 
services for LA and as a provider of sorting and pre-treat-
ment services for recyclables for packaging producers is 
the answer to the research question on how waste pickers 
should be invited to work with the formal WM system to 
achieve an ISWM and make cities more sustainable and 
inclusive. Based on the polluter pays principle, packaging 
producers should be responsible for financing this system 
in LMIC by paying fees that, together with the household-
ers’ WM fees, should cover the total costs of both services. 
Further research is needed to suggest how these costs can 
be fairly defined and to assess what is the best governance 
needed to collect and manage these fees. As well as to 
improve data collection and assessment on EPR and waste 
management. Such aspects are highly criticized in both EU 
and BR schemes.
Learning how to work in an inclusive operational mode 
FIGURE 10: Inclusive EPR schemes contribution to the Integrated Sustainable Municipal Waste Management. Source: Elaborated by the 
author from Wilson et al. 2013.
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can be crucial to achieve increasing plastic recycling tar-
gets agreed by packaging producers worldwide and im-
portant to achieve the ambitious EU waste recovery and 
diversion targets listed in Table 2. Particularly in those EU 
countries where IRS activities have been imputed to meet, 
exceed, or at least be indispensable to achieve EU objec-
tives for recycling and recovery, such as for some Eastern 
EU countries with a largely Roma IRS (Scheinberg et al. 
2016; Mrkajić et al. 2018; Ferronato et al. 2019; da Cruz et 
al. 2014 ; GiZ 2018a). It would also be beneficial for improv-
ing the local recycling industry due to the increased availa-
bility of diverse secondary raw materials, and for creating 
green jobs capable of absorbing unskilled labour.
5. CONCLUSIONS
After a comparative analysis between the Brazilian and 
EU EPR schemes for packaging, the research highlighted 
some aspects and advantageous results of the contribu-
tion of the inclusive EPR scheme to increase the efficiency 
of the municipal WM in resource recovery. An equitable and 
inclusive P-EPR is proposed as a simpler and less expen-
sive innovative solution for the implementation of packag-
ing EPR, constituting a more accessible WM modernization 
system for emerging countries, including some in the EU.
The study also showed that improvements in the EPR 
schemes must be implemented. The lack of strong and 
structured initiatives to improve the separation of dry 
waste at the source and the involvement of LA as an inter-
ested party prevented the BR P-EPR scheme from rapidly 
increasing recycling rates. These actions can not only im-
prove overall waste recycling rates, but also improve WPs' 
livelihoods, since a large part of their income depends on 
the sale of materials.
It is also observed that just defining and controlling 
waste recycling goals does not necessarily result in real 
improvements in the general waste management system. 
Both the EU and BR P-EPR systems do not have effective 
cost and cost-effectiviness control, which could guarantee 
efficiency improvements in WM policies.
Reporting and data control on EPR and WM also need 
to be improved and harmonized to ensure efficient imple-
mentation of the expected environmental objectives of EPR 
schemes. This is not an exclusive defect of the inclusive 
FIGURE 11: Schematical representation of an Equitable and Inclusive P-EPR scheme. Source: Elaborated by the author.
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P-EPR system, but it seems to be related to the inability of 
governments to make companies agree to pay real recy-
cling costs, as well as to reduce the quantities of marketed 
packaging, which can be observed throughout the world.
However, neither these nor other aspects described 
seem to prevent the inclusive P-EPR model from being 
transposed to other countries where the presence of waste 
pickers is registered, despite the political and institutional 
issues that may arise and need to be addressed.
The inclusive and equitable P-EPR scheme is presented 
as a solution for the inclusion of the IRS in the WM, as well 
as to achieve the ISWM in LMIC. The scheme can make 
cities more sustainable, inclusive, and capable of improv-
ing global recycling rates and reaching the highest plastic 
recycling targets agreed by many packaging producers to-
wards the Circular Economy.
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